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Abstract 
In this article, I argue that technical reporting and documentation processes function to mitigate 
uncertainty and enable complex systems in the endeavor of big science. The argument draws on 
two years of field research investigating technical reporting and documentation processes at a 
federally-funded supercomputing center dedicated to scientific research. A central question the 
study sought to answer was, “How does one build a new supercomputer?” One of the answers 
that emerged is that supercomputers are built by the genre assemblages of documents that 
mitigate financial, political and technological uncertainties, and their attendant risks, that are 
inherent to technoscientific cutting-edge enterprises. Given their centrality, these genre 
assemblages function as essential infrastructure for the US national laboratory system and for big 
science endeavors in general. In conclusion, this article argues that documentation that mitigates 





How to build a supercomputer: US research infrastructure and documents that mitigate 
the uncertainties of big science 
 
“National laboratories are crucibles of uncertainty. While their scientists eagerly probe the 
frontiers of knowledge, never knowing where their research will lead, their managers grapple 
daily with questions of relevance and survival.” (Holl, p. ix, my emphasis). 
 
Big science is uncertain. So much so, in fact, that Alan Schriesheim, a former director of 
the US national laboratory that was the field site for the research reported in this article, wrote 
the fact of uncertainty into the first line of his forward to a volume about the laboratory’s post-
World War II history. The uncertainty faced by scientists and managers, Schriesheim writes, is 
driven by questions of “relevance and survival” (Holl, p. ix), such as:  
• How to anticipate society’s emerging technology needs?  
• How to mount credible research programs to meet those needs?  
• How to secure government funding and public support and an ongoing national 
commitment to the future?” (Holl, p. ix) 
Given that Shriesheim goes on to characterize the challenge of big science as “daunting” 
and “success [as] ephemeral,” it can seem incredible that any project of big science, such as the 
United States’ Hubble Space Telescope or the Europe’s Large Hadron Collider (LHC), ever 
comes to fruition: there are countless reasons why big science can’t and won’t work. This is 
because “Big science is hard” (Turner, 2015), a notion that becomes comprehensible when “big” 
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is understood to mean “expansion on many axes” (Galison & Hevly, p. 2), and not just simply a 
science project with a massive budget and an expansive timeframe. These axes include 
geographic (projects that have an impact on whole regions or even nations), economic (budgets 
of millions or billions of dollars), multidisciplinary (engaging scientists from many areas of 
science) and multinational (the investment of multiple nations). Given these axes of complexity, 
it is easy to see that uncertainty, and the risks that uncertainty create, are inherent to the 
enterprise of big science projects. Likewise, mitigating uncertainty must be inherent to big 
science projects as well, if they are to succeed. Writing, this article argues, plays an essential role 
in this mitigation. 
This article reports on a study of technical reporting and documentation processes at a 
site of big science, a national laboratory facility operating the world’s fourth fastest 
supercomputer (when it came online in 2012). The study began as a project to document a 
complex annual reporting process to the supercomputing center’s funder, the Department of 
Energy, but it evolved into a broader study that examined the multiple functions for technical 
reporting and documentation at a large technical facility, including the function to mitigate 
operational, organizational, technological, financial, and political uncertainty.   
In retrospect, it may not seem surprising that insight into the essential function of 
documentation to mitigate uncertainty in complex systems came at a supercomputing center at a 
national laboratory. Why? Due to their scale and complexity, big science projects require an 
uncommon level of coordination among stakeholders and the mitigation of substantial financial, 
political and technological uncertainties, and their attendant risks, to come to fruition. With so 
much uncertainty, how can the associated risks ever be deemed acceptable to the stakeholders in 
government, science and industry who stand to either gain or lose a lot depending on the success 
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of the project? This question is especially relevant in a post-Cold War world where the 
rationalization for government funding of big science has changed from national defense to 
economic development via collaboration with industry (Jacob & Hallonsten, 2012, p. 413), and it 
has shaped the stories of how big science projects in the US and around the world were 
conceived and developed during the post-Cold War era. 
And big science projects do fail. In 1993, the US Congress cancelled funding for the 
Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) to be built in Waxahachie, Texas after decades of 
development and $2 billion dollars of investment. But the indisputable material existence of the 
machines of big science, such as the supercomputer in this study, shows that, unlike the case of 
the SSC, the uncertainty and attendant risks of big science are not always terminal. Big science 
projects succeed in part because they are able to overcome the uncertainties inherent to such 
complex endeavors, and writing plays an essential role in this success. Writing Studies 
researchers can learn a lot from big science about how technical reporting and documentation 
processes function to mitigate uncertainty and enable complex systems. This insight gives 
writing researchers, as well as facility staff, tools to understand the value and the purpose of high 
stakes documentation processes that consume so much staff time but that are often considered to 
be secondary in value to time spent on the daily operations of the machine and other technical 
work.  
The notion that writing and writing processes have an essential function for scientific and 
engineering organizations, and organizations in general, is not new to Writing Studies research 
(e.g., Bazerman & Paradis, 1991; Doheny-Farina, 1986; Fountain, 2014; Geisler, 2001; Paradis, 
et. al, 1985; Read, 2019; Read & Papka, 2014, 2016; Spinuzzi, 2003, 2008, 2010; Wickman, 
2010; Winsor 1989, 1994, 1999, 2003; Yates, 1993). As a body of research, Writing Studies has 
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established that writing, the practice of knowledge-based professions, and the operations of 
organizations, share a complex relationship. Indeed, we have come a long way: When Paradis, 
Dobrin & Miller (1985) began their research into writing at Exxon ITD, writing activities in 
industry were “hidden,” “an afterthought to serious research,” and “just got done” (p. 281). They 
argued that the “consequence of this neglect” was a poor understanding of the functions of what 
they called “in-house” writing (p. 281). Since 1985, Writing scholars have developed and drawn 
on genre theory, activity theory, and actor-network theory (ANT), often in combination, to study 
and theorize writing products, processes and activities as mediational means (e.g., Geisler, 2001), 
as standing sets of transformations (e.g., Spinuzzi et. al., 2016), as constitutive of normal 
organizational operations (Read & Papka, 2014), and as tools to create and maintain the 
structures and activities of a workplace (e.g., Spinuzzi, 2010; Winsor, 1999).  
Despite this extensive body of research, however, the various functions of writing have 
not always been systematically articulated or codified in a way that can be applied in industry 
and inform writing pedagogy. This article adds to the documented functions of writing in 
technical organizations by presenting a case of how writing functions in a context that is not 
readily accessible to students or the general public: a supercomputing center at a national 
laboratory. In the case of the supercomputing center as a site of big science, this project begins 
with the assumption that, similar to economic and material infrastructures, processes of technical 
reporting and documentation are essential to the national research infrastructure for big science 
in the US. Understanding the infrastructural function of documentation processes at the 
supercomputing center is one step towards a fully theorized notion of writing as infrastructural 
(Read, 2019). 
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To make visible how common documentation processes mitigate the uncertainty at the 
supercomputing center, I draw on genre theory and the construct of genre assemblage in 
particular. According to Spinuzzi, genre assemblages function collectively as constituent genres 
that are “arrayed in a standing set of transformations (SST’s)” (Spinuzzi, et. al., 2016, p. 8). 
SST’s are stable sites of rhetorical transformations that allow writing researchers to see how a 
genre assemblage reliably mediates a technological, managerial, or political uncertainty, or 
“trial” (p. 8), that, in the present article, must be overcome in order to build a new 
supercomputer. Based on the analysis of documentation processes as genre assemblages, as 
described by supercomputing center staff in interviews, I argue that the mitigation of uncertainty 
is one case of an “infrastructural function” (Read, 2019, p. 234) for writing in organizational 
environments. A theoretically informed notion of the infrastructural function of writing has 





Research Infrastructure for Big Science 
 
It is not a coincidence that the US has been relatively successful at developing and 
operating big science projects in the post-World War II era. This is because over time the US has 
developed stable government infrastructures that reduce, or at least regularize responses to, the 
inherent uncertainties of big science projects. Researchers in the field of science and public 
policy have already established that ensuring the long-term success of a big science project 
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requires this kind of infrastructure, including a government policy for setting priorities for 
scientific research and for allocating reliable funding streams that account for inevitable future 
cost increases and economic changes (Hallonsten, 2015; Traweek, 1992). Without this policy 
infrastructure, projects risk running aground on the shoals of the ugly politics of allocating 
additional funding to a long-term project that has outgrown its original budget. In contrast, 
European science has generally not codified policy and procedures for multinational big science 
collaboration across Europe, and so each project has to effectively reinvent the wheel and 
navigate the political and policy landscape of the day. This lack of policy infrastructure exposes 
projects that rely on the investment of multiple nations to the fickle winds of politics when big 
science projects develop over decades and require a stable and centralized science policy and 
economic infrastructure. 
In contrast to the largely ad hoc European approach to the development of big, multi-
national science projects, such as the LCH, the US’s Department of Energy (DOE) system of 
national laboratories, including the host laboratory of the supercomputing facility, has a much 
more developed research infrastructure for managing the costs of projects and their timeframe 
for development. The US system has developed a relatively stable policy and economic 
infrastructure for negotiating “priority and investment” (Hallonsten, 2015, p. 3) for the 
development of big science projects. This development has been motivated during the post-Cold 
War era by the removal of a geopolitical or military motive for maintaining a system of 
government-funded scientific laboratories. In response, the DOE laboratories have managed to 
persist via gradually transforming their missions and activities to align with the social, political 
and economic conditions of the late 20th and early 21st centuries (Hallonsten & Heinze, 2012, p. 
458). This means that the laboratories have developed new policies and practices for sharing the 
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risks of big science with stakeholders in industry and with universities as the “moral economy” 
for funding big science has shifted to valuing “entrepreneurship and measurable utility” 
(Westfall, 2012, p. 448). These policies and practices are codified in documentation processes 
that are essential to the research infrastructure of the US national laboratory system.  
For example, a key document in the contemporary national systemic research 
infrastructure for the DOE national laboratories is the Management and Operating (M & O) 
contract. This contract positions the DOE as a steward and overseer of each individual laboratory 
in the system, but not as the operator, which is usually either a university or an LLC.  The M & 
O contract codifies a relationship between the DOE and the non-governmental operation in a 
way that: 
“enables the Government to establish objectives for the laboratories’ research programs 
and to exercise controls necessary to assure security, safety, and the prudent use of 
public funds, while allowing private sector organizations selected for the technical 
ability and managerial expertise to carry out the laboratories’ day-to-day operations” 
(https://science.energy.gov/lp/management-and-operating-contracts/).  
This defined arrangement shares the uncertainty of operating a national laboratory with 
government, public and private universities and helps to mitigate the financial risks (and 
therefore also political risks) of operating the laboratories by freeing the laboratories to pursue 
non-governmental sources of funding. These sources are mainly industrial, which have become 
increasingly important as federal funding for science has waned since the end of the Cold War. 
Because the M & O contract codifies a set of complex negotiated arrangements among multiple 
stakeholders, it brings stability to the national laboratory by functioning as a layer of financial 
and political risk mitigation at a systemic level.  
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As I studied technical documentation and reporting processes more generally at a 
supercomputing facility hosted at a national laboratory, I discovered the following: where there is 
a financial, political or technological uncertainty there is a document or document process to 
mitigate it. The emergence of my thinking is important to understanding this project, as I did not 
set out to study organizational risk or risk communication, both of which are independently 
established areas of research. Rather, I set out to study the functions of writing and 
documentation at the supercomputing center, and over time, I made connections between the 
highly contingent environment of a national laboratory and the documentation processes that I 
was studying. These connections revealed the centrality of technical reporting and 
documentation processes to the mitigation of the inherent uncertainties of a big science project at 
the cutting edge of technological development. Over time I also realized that these connections 
turned out to be one of the answers to the overall research question that I brought to the field site: 
“How do documents build a supercomputer?” This insight was a product of the methodological 
lens that I brought to the data I collected during fieldwork, that of an actor-network theory 
(ANT) informed view of how writing functions infrastructurally for organizations (Read, 2019).  
 
Actor-Network Theory: Viewing documents as traces of the actor network that assembled 
the supercomputer 
 
Standing in the chilly, roaring machine room that houses the supercomputer among rows and 
rows of black metal cases that enclose 786,432 processors capable of processing 10 quadrillion 
calculations per second, nothing could be more certain than the supercomputer’s substantial 
materiality [Fig. 1].  
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INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 1. The supercomputer Mira in 2014. Photo by author. 
 
What is less immediately comprehensible is how the supercomputer was built, or “stood up” in 
the parlance of high-performance computing, since none of the rhetorical, political, technical or 
manual labor required to build the machine leaves an explicit trace on the supercomputer. Even 
the decorative images on the computer’s casing do not reveal information about where the 
hundreds of millions of dollars come from to build it, who had to be persuaded to spend so much 
money, how many people (hundreds, if not thousands) it took to design, manufacture, build and 
now operate and use the machine, how their work was coordinated and how it was that the 
cutting-edge technological innovation behind the machine’s unique computing architecture 
happened to work and at the right time. This lack of information presses on the curious visitor to 
the supercomputing center as questions that are not easy to answer, even by a facility staff 
member touring me through the machine room. This is because the answers are distributed across 
the experiences, memories and documentation of up to 85 staff members, and even more when 
players in Washington, DC, such as DOE program managers and members of Congress, are 
taken into account. While the machine is also unable to answer these questions for us, Latourian 
Actor-network theory (ANT) offers a helpful methodology for exploring where an object, 
especially a material object of technology, came from and how it was possible that it could come 
into being at all given how many threats challenged its existence (Latour, 1996; Read & Swarts, 
2015).  
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From an ANT perspective, traces of the assembled actor network of which the 
supercomputer is an outcome (Read & Swarts, 2015, p. 17) exist in forms of documentation that 
underwrote the development of the new machine. For Writing Studies researchers, ANT helps us 
to answer questions about the machine’s origins by focusing our attention on the rhetorical 
settlements, or negotiated alliances among human and non-human actors, that are inscribed in 
documents and documentation processes, and when they recur, genres and genre assemblages. 
As inscribed nodes of social action that mediate socio-technical networks in complex 
organizational environments (e.g., Spinuzzi, 2003, 2004), genres codify, stabilize and make 
visible (Read, 2016) the translations among actors essential to big science projects, including 
building and maintaining a supercomputer. 
 
Genre Assemblages and Standing Sets of Transformations (SSTs) 
 
Genres of documentation at the supercomputing center are one site to explore and theorize the 
US national research infrastructure. When genres related to a defined network effect, or outcome, 
are studied collectively (Spinuzzi, 2004, 2010), the larger socio-technical network that is 
mediated and inscribed by the complex system of genres comes into view. In other words, 
tracing the accretion, or successive enrollment, of actors via the various official genres of 
documentation handled by the facility staff answers the question that confronts the visitor to the 
machine room at the supercomputing center: how was it possible to build such a complex and 
expensive machine? This study traces how several genre assemblages mitigate the political, 
technological and financial uncertainties that are inherent to big science projects and, 
specifically, to the work of building a new supercomputer.  
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Because genre assemblages recur over time in response to the recurring need for certain 
types of rhetorical settlements, they become a site for “represent[ing] and transform[ing]” 
(Spinuzzi, 2010, p. 368) a series of complex translations that ally essential actors to a project 
(Read & Papka, 2014; Spinuzzi 2004; 2010). This rhetorical work is reliably accomplished 
across the successive genres of a genre assemblage (the partial analogy of an assembly line 
comes to mind here) by what Spinuzzi (2010, 2016, et. al.) has referred to as standing sets of 
transformations (SSTs).  
For Writing Studies researchers, standing sets of transformations (SSTs) instantiated in 
genre assemblages offer a useful lens through which to study documentation processes as 
essential research infrastructure for big science. In some ways, SSTs are akin to stations on a 
rhetorical assembly line. They do rhetorical work that has been codified within the context of the 
social action that the assemblage’s genres enact within a community or organization. For 
example, as a rhetorical product (e.g., a pitch argument for a new technology company) bobs 
down the assembly line of genres, it is successfully revised and refined as essential stakeholders 
(e.g., investors, customers) in the project are allied, or interessed, with it (Spinuzzi et. al, 2018, p. 
7).  
SSTs are essential to complex systems because they bring relative stability and 
predictability to the processes that they mediate (Spinuzzi, 2010; Spinuzzi et. al, 2018). In other 
words, one of their functions is to mitigate threats to the success of a complex project. SSTs 
mitigate uncertainty, and the risks that uncertainty creates, via reliable processes of rhetorical 
transformation that result in rhetorical settlements, or negotiated alliances among essential 
actors. Over time, succeeding rhetorical settlements “become a set of accretions that [are] 
hardened into operational procedures…” (Spinuzzi, 2008, p. 97) that, I would argue, function as 
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an infrastructure. Making visible these SSTs and the genres of documents that instantiate them 
foregrounds for scholars and stakeholders in industry how documents and documentation 
processes that have normalized into tacit operational procedures remain critical sites of 
negotiation upon which the success of a project depends.  
Similar to that of genre assemblages and SSTs, Sauer’s (2003) ethnographic study of how 
documentation rhetorically mitigates uncertainty and risk in the mining industry offers another 
foundation for studying the rhetorical fate of uncertainty in large industrial environments. Sauer 
documented how miner’s experiences in a hazardous work environment are rhetorically 
transformed across six moments in a document cycle (accident reports, statistical reports, policy 
and regulations, practices and procedures and training procedures) that incrementally transform 
the miners’ individual experience of risk into changes in training procedures that will improve 
safety in the mine.  Over time the rhetorical settlements accrete, or accumulate in successive 
layers that create stability, to become part of the history of the industry and, ideally, an 
improvement in safety for miners.  
Although Sauer’s study was focused on a different type of risk than I take up in this 
study, that is the health and environmental risks of working in a hazardous environment rather 
than the financial, technological and political uncertainties of complex organizations and projects 
(see Jardine & Hrudey, 1997 for types of risk, including uncertainty), the rhetorical mechanics of 
Sauer’s “Cycle of Technical Documentation in Large Regulatory Industries” (p. 66) are similar 
to that of genre assemblages and SST’s. Both analytical constructs serve as lenses for making 
material successive “moments” (p. 76) of rhetorical negotiation in complex, multi-document 
processes. However, while Sauer’s model focuses primarily on the transformation of the 
documents’ content, SST’s foundation in actor-network theory places the focus of rhetorical 
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transformation on the goal to ally essential actors to the project. In addition, the origins of SST’s 
within the context of genre study, with its focus on bringing stability and predictability to 
otherwise rhetorically chaotic processes, foregrounds for writing researchers how genre 
assemblages, and the SST’s they instantiate, function as infrastructure for a broader socio-
technical network of which a complex project of big science is an outcome. Without this genre 
infrastructure and its machine-like power to enroll key stakeholders, big science may not happen 
at all.  
 
Risk as an Explicit Concern of Management 
 
Given that risk is an explicit concern of management in industry, an obvious starting 
place for the study of documentation processes that mediate uncertainty at the supercomputing 
center may initially appear to be the Risk Management Plan (RMP). The RMP documents the 
formal process of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), which is an approach to “organiz[ing] 
uncertainty” (Arena, et. al, 2010, p. 659) broadly adopted by risk-adverse enterprises in 
government and industry, including the Department of Energy (DOE). ERM emerged in the 
1990s in response to changes in the competitive environment, including the increasing exposure 
of enterprises to complex global economic and political forces (Arena, et. al, 2010). ERM 
considers risks such as financial exposure, information system interruptions, fraud, client 
bankruptcies and regulatory change (p. 660). 
At the supercomputing center, the RMP manages project risks (for machines in 
development) and steady-state, or operating, risks (for machines that are up and running) via a 
formalized process that follows the ERM model and directives set by the DOE. As the Advisor 
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to the Director of the supercomputing facility said in an interview, “[DOE] will do anything to 
avoid having anything unexpected happen to them.” She went on to explain that risk in this 
context does not equal worker or facility safety—a completely different area of concern overseen 
largely by the national laboratory’s facilities management department. She further clarified that 
risk means “situations that in some way impact the [supercomputing facility’s] ability to meet the 
needs of the user, either financial impact, operation of the machine, performance of the machine, 
having the machine available because our power fails or cooling system fails and so forth.” In 
other words, the RMP manages risk at what we might call a meta-level by creating a model that 
incorporates all of the processes that go into building and operating a supercomputer, such as the 
ones this study documents in detail.  
The RMP (or ERM) is not, however, the explicit focus of this study, even though formal 
risk management plays a role in the project development and management of the supercomputing 
center. This study focuses, by design, on document processes that are not already explicitly or 
conventionally primarily understood by Writing Studies researchers or by industry stakeholders 
as related to risk management or communication. ERM, and risk management in general, is a 
prolific area of research in academic fields such as accounting and management studies, and 
senior management at the supercomputing center would already have exposure to this literature. 
Instead, this study took up Bowker and Star’s (1999) notion of infrastructural inversion as a 
project to “look closely at technologies and arrangements that, by design and by habit, tend to 
fade into the woodwork” (p. 34). For writing researchers, this means revisiting common 
industrial documentation processes that have low-visibility outside of the immediate work 
context with lenses that “give them causal prominence” in contexts that otherwise attribute 
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technological achievements to “heroic actors” over seemingly inert reports, spreadsheets and 
other genres of technical writing (p. 34). 
 
Study Design and Method 
The Study 
The field work reported in this article is part of a larger study, conducted 2014-2016, that 
explored technical reporting and documentation processes at a supercomputing center at a 
Department of Energy (DOE) funded national laboratory near Chicago, Illinois. Data were 
gathered under the auspices of the Institutional Review Board at DePaul University. The center 
serves scientists from around the world who are granted time on the supercomputer to process 
data for developing models of scientific phenomena, such as climate-related models, air 
turbulence over an aircraft wing and the flow patterns of a new, more environmentally friendly 
form of concrete. Around 85 staff work at the facility and their jobs range in function from the 
strategic and political work of the director and senior management to the daily maintenance of 
the machine and its supporting systems.  
The main aim of the study was to document the reporting processes that supported the 
development and operations of the facility for the purpose of making this information available 
for strategic decision making by center staff and to demonstrate the value of these reports for the 
facility. During the period of fieldwork, 25 facility staff were interviewed and the audio files 
transcribed in full, over 500 pages of documents were gathered and catalogued, and I did over a 
hundred hours of on-site informal observation, most of it sitting in a cubicle waiting to interview 
staff or attend meetings. The main focus of data collection was an annual operational review 
process that the facility undertook with its funder, the DOE, to renew its funding. Data were 
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coded and analyzed incrementally, resulting in a series of papers reporting on portions of the 
study (Read, 2018, 2019; Read & Papka, 2014, 2016, 2017).  
The accounts of the documentation processes discussed in this article are reconstructed 
from five interviews with facility staff during a second round of interviews that focused on what 
I had come to understand as “infrastructural” writing. The construct of infrastructural writing 
originated in a first-round interview with a systems administrator who referred repeatedly to the 
computing “infrastructure” that he maintains in order to ensure that science gets done on the 
machine. I approach “infrastructure” (Read, 2019) as a term commonly applied in a computing 
context to standards, software and hardware as a metaphor that in common use entails an 
underlying foundation that enables work or activity but that also has relational entailments that 
expand infrastructure beyond a material substrate (Dourish & Bell, 2011, Star & Ruhleder, 
1996). The metaphor of infrastructure, however, has not been as systematically developed to 
apply to documentation, and the second round of interviews aimed to gather data to do just that. 
These interviews specifically aimed to garner explanations from staff who managed document 
processes mentioned during the first round that had potential as infrastructural documentation 
processes. These documentation process had caught my eye because the mission of the 
supercomputing center seemed to depend upon them even though they were not explicitly 
viewed in this light by staff. These document processes included user agreements, multi-division 
DOE review processes, IT documentation, lease agreements, and project management. The latter 
two—lease agreements and project management—are the focus of this article.  
While the supercomputing facility is publicly-funded and so subject to the Freedom of 
Information Act, I was limited in my access to documentation that had not been formally 
published for public circulation. This was particularly the case for the documentation processes 
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that are the subject of this article, which were largely outside of the annual reporting processes 
that I was directly authorized to study. As such, much of my documentation of the less public 
writing products and processes at the facility relies heavily on accounts recorded in interviews 
with staff or my observation of documents on a screen. This lack of access to the documentation 
itself limits the analytical work that can be done with these artifacts primarily to description in 
the words of the staff interviewed. In fact, the accounts of documentation processes that I 
examine in this article are written largely in the transcribed words of the staff interviewed, 
although only quotes with special significance are attributed since no single person owns the 
processes described here.   
As a theory-making project, and similar to previous arguments I have made about theory 
in Writing Studies (Read, 2016; Read, 2015; Read & Swarts, 2015), this article is the product of 
a methodology through which insight is gleaned inductively from experiences, interviews and 
artifacts gathered during fieldwork. I understand theory development as a process of 
documentation and operationalization of field-specific knowledge during which the specialized 
training of the researcher is dialogically engaged with the voices and artifacts gathered at the 
field site. The product of this theory-making process is not a model that claims to reflect a stable 
reality at the field site (although it should be recognizable to study participants); rather, the 
product is a theoretical tool that has utility for researchers and study collaborators. With these 
tools, researchers are better able to translate the often-tacit professional writing practices and 
knowledge of study participants into explicit, documented knowledge that ultimately contributes 
to what we know about writing more generally. Site collaborators take away a greater knowledge 
of their organizational writing processes that they can use for strategic decision making.  
 
 19 
How Documents Build A Supercomputer 
 
This section will deploy the analytical construct of standing sets of transformations (SSTs) 
instantiated in genre assemblages to show how two document processes rhetorically transform 
the financial, technological and political uncertainties that are constant threats to building a 
supercomputer. Within this framework, financing and project management are both sites, or 
nodes (Spinuzzi, 2008, p. 49), of rhetorical transformation where rhetorical-political settlements 
are negotiated and then inscribed to mediate the alliance of key actors with the project (e.g., a 
bank, a reasonable interest rate, a working chip design). Taming unquantified uncertainties into 
known and acceptable risks requires inscription (Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1986), so that 
the negotiated settlements can be circulated among stakeholders for discussion, review and, 
ultimately, codification. Documentation processes, therefore, are a natural site of study for risk 
mitigation. 
Neither of the genre assemblages documented in this section are commonly studied 
within Writing Studies research. Bringing financing, lease negotiation and project management 
within the purview of Writing Studies broadens our notion of what counts as writing and also 
moves our study of writing in organizational environments closer to the documents that might be 
part of what Susan Leigh Star (1999) counted among the “boring things,” or “accretions that 
have hardened into operational procedures” (Spinuzzi, 2008, p. 97) that function as the 
infrastructure for much of life, especially in the socio-technical realm.  
 
In order for a new supercomputer to be built, or “stood up,” at least two risks must be 
satisfactorily resolved so that key stakeholders can be allied:  
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1. The money to pay for it must be secured on favorable terms (financing) (Fig. 2) 
2. The development and construction of the supercomputer must be coordinated to fit a 
given budget and timeframe (project management) (Fig. 3) 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Risk #1:  Can it be financed? The money to pay for the supercomputer must be secured on 
favorable terms 
 
Getting a loan to buy anything is always a process of negotiation and trust building. The bigger 
the loan and the more complex and varied the uncertainties that affect how and when the loan 
will be repaid, the longer and more complex the process of negotiation. The negotiation cannot 
end until both parties feel that the risk inherent to the transaction is acceptable to them. Whether 
it is a student applying for a credit card ($10,000 or less in credit), a first-time home owner 
applying for a mortgage ($100,000-$300,000) or a national laboratory securing financing for a 
new supercomputer ($100 million), the negotiation of trust is underwritten by a slew of 
documents, each of which contributes in some way to reducing the uncertainties that might 
discourage either party from completing the deal. For the negotiation of a financing agreement to 
purchase a supercomputer, these documents include: the purchase agreement with the 
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manufacturer of the computer, a due diligence package, a preliminary lease agreement, a 
financing agreement, and spreadsheet financial tools for bid analysis.  
In a rational banking system, no bank will lend the money for a home mortgage to a 
hopeful homeowner who cannot establish themselves as credit worthy. The same is true for 
national laboratories and some of those same big banks. But in the business of procuring and 
building supercomputers, there is an additional wrinkle—the risk that the bank takes on is not 
limited to the credit worthiness of the customer. Unlike a house, which is either already built or 
likely to be built using tried and true building technology and designs, a next generation 
supercomputer will be built using technology and materials that are still under development and 
may not yet be proven to work as specified. Whether the supercomputer can be built to the 
original technical specifications and on time is an additional arena of uncertainty that must be 
mitigated in the process of securing financing for the supercomputer. What this means is that the 
terms of the financing and the technical specifications of the supercomputer are interdependent.  
According to the finance advisor at the supercomputing center, it’s a simple relationship: 
 
“How much money we have impacts the size of the machine. If we’re spending a lot on 
interest [for a bank loan] it means we get less machine.” 
 
During the initial process of securing financing for a lease on a new supercomputer, however, the 
processes of determining the technical specifications of the machine and the terms of the loan for 
financing are separated. This is because the banking institution originating the loan does not have 
an interest in the technical aspects of the machine. Their only interest is the credit-worthiness of 
the national laboratory applying for the loan. However, although the technical specifications and 
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the negotiation to secure a favorable interest rate and terms for repayment are initially 
independent, once there is a preliminary agreement on a bid for a loan the technical 
specifications may come into play in the negotiation of the final terms of the loan. This is 
because when a new supercomputing machine is delivered by the vendor, one of the world’s 
leading chip manufacturers, it must go through a series of tests to ensure that it meets the 
technical specifications that were initially agreed upon with the machine’s vendor in the 
purchase agreement. If the machine fails on certain specifications, which would not be wholly 
unexpected given the cutting- edge nature of the technology, then this is grounds for 
renegotiating the price of the machine with the vendor. Renegotiating the price of the machine 
changes the amount of principal for the loan and also the timeframe for repayment if the 
acceptance date of the machine is pushed back, and this can affect the interest rate as well. 
Although initially the negotiation of the loan terms is separated from the technical specifications 
of the machine, the extent to which the machine’s vendor is able to deliver a machine that meets 
those specifications within the agreed upon time period ultimately affects the final conditions of 
the loan.  
The rhetorical settlements that must accrete to mitigate the financial risks inherent to 
procuring a supercomputer are [Fig. 2]: 
 
1. The trustworthiness (credit worthiness) of the national laboratory to make good on the 
loan.  
2. Acceptable financial terms for the loan (including the amount of principal, the interest 
rate and the rate and time frame of repayment). 
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3. Demonstrated viability of the new technology and its ability to function to specification 
within the project timeframe. 
 
A closer look at each area of risk reveals the documentation processes that mediate the rhetorical 
settlements that in turn enable the alliance of key actors. 
 
Rhetorical Settlement 1: Trustworthiness  
 
The trustworthiness of the national laboratory is the first rhetorical settlement [Fig. 2, Risk 1] 
that must accrete in order to satisfactorily mitigate the financial risks of building the 
supercomputer. According to the finance advisor at the supercomputing center, trust is the most 
important element in a finance deal: “It comes down to trust on both sides. Do I trust that they 
are going to deliver the cash when I need it and do they trust that we will pay it back? There’s no 
document that you can produce that will guarantee either of those.” True, there is no document 
that can substitute for the most fragile and essential element of relationships, but documents can 
and do inscribe rhetorical settlements upon which trust is founded. The national laboratory 
establishes its trustworthiness with financial institutions to take on a large financial liability via a 
document process called the due diligence process.  
The due diligence process is mediated by a packet of materials that includes financial 
reports, biographies and information about who works at the laboratory and how these people 
have successfully built supercomputers before.  These materials must explain how national 
laboratories are funded and why investing in them is a safe investment. Collectively, they must 
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persuade the top executives at a banking institution, called the credit committee, that the 
laboratory is trustworthy enough to take on a loan of $50 million to $100 million, or more.  
The bank credit committee makes its decision based on its assessment of the case that is 
presented by the front-line loan officers. The loan officers have been working directly with the 
personnel in the procurement department at the national laboratory to begin the bid process for 
the loan. Given that it is likely that this banking institution does not specialize in funding 
supercomputing projects, these front-line loan officers have a hefty job of persuasion: to make an 
unknown and mysterious entity (the national laboratory) into a knowable and trustworthy one—
as opposed to an organization, in the words of the finance advisor, “where we have a bunch of 
incompetence and failure.” And there is a lot at stake: the safer the bet the laboratory appears to 
be for the bank, the better the financing terms will be for the laboratory.  
 
Rhetorical Settlement 2: Acceptable Financial Terms  
 
Acceptable terms for the loan are the second rhetorical settlement [Fig. 2, Risk 2] that must 
accrete in order fully mitigate the financial risks of building the supercomputer. These are 
negotiated and codified via standing sets of transformations instantiated in an assemblage of 
genres that includes a type of loan document, a preliminary master lease agreement, as well as an 
invitation to bid on a lease, financial analysis tools, and the financing/purchasing agreement. The 
rhetorical settlements that must be inscribed and accrete to move along the supercomputer 
project are acceptable financial terms, which include the amount of principal, the interest rate 
and the rate and time frame of repayment.  
A lease might be the legal document that most adults have encountered or signed 
(whether for an apartment, a car, or a supercomputer) but that few have read closely in its 
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entirety. Yet, lease documents and mortgage documents mediate the highest-risk financial 
transactions that most people ever encounter in their own personal lives. One reason a lease 
document makes dry reading is that the majority of the terms of the lease are common to all 
similar leases and only a few terms are actually open for negotiation (when it comes to apartment 
leases, cities often have boilerplate forms with only a few fill-in-the blank lines for the 
negotiable items, such as the monthly rent and the term of the lease). Most of the terms on the 
lease form a foundation that have been previously negotiated in arenas now distant in time and 
place from the current transaction. This is usually a good thing, because those standardized 
elements have been worked out by advocates of both the lessee and the lessor to stabilize and 
minimize the risk of both parties and to ensure a measure of equity across all similar lease 
negotiations.   
 In the case of procuring a supercomputer, which is among the riskier transactions that the 
national laboratory would engage in because of the large amount of money involved, the 
situation is not all that much different from other, typical leases. Much of the language on the 
lease is standardized before the negotiation of the highest-risk terms of the lease, including the 
amount of principal and the interest rate, begins. The document that inscribes these standardized 
items is called the preliminary master lease agreement, which is a generic lease document that 
states all the general terms for the lease.  All of the financial institutions that want to qualify to 
make a bid to finance the machine must sign the preliminary master lease agreement before the 
bid process is started in order to signal that they accept those terms as a foundation for further 
negotiation.   
 The next document that goes out from the procurement department at the laboratory is the 
invitation to bid on the lease. This document goes out to all of the “qualified” banking 
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institutions that have declared themselves by signing the preliminary master lease agreement. 
The invitation includes the specifications of the kind of financing deal that the lab is looking for: 
the amount of money, the length of the lease and the interest rate. Then the banks submit their 
bid and the laboratory culls the list to a manageable number, around half a dozen.  
Once the list has been culled, a writing-intensive part of the process begins as negotiation 
for the terms of the loan proceeds in earnest, and the seriousness of the bidders is tested by the 
laboratory. The finance advisor characterized this phase in the following way: “Okay, you’re on 
our short list. Do you want to sharpen your pencil with respect to your bid?” During the 
negotiation back and forth, emails and document sharing mediate phone calls and meetings 
between the bidding financial institutions and the national laboratory. Sharpening a pencil is an 
apt metaphor for a negotiation during which both parties are assessing the amount of risk 
involved and insisting on even better terms for themselves. Pushing too hard for better terms, 
especially if the rhetorical settlement of trust has not fully accreted, could break off the tip of the 
pencil and end the negotiation and the possibility of a deal.  
 One of the purposes (and advantages) of a multi-step, multi-document bid process is that 
it takes a long time and as time passes the amount of risk can decrease for both parties. In 
Figures 1 and 2, time is a vector across the top of the table because time and risk are deeply 
interdependent in projects at the cutting edge of technology. Most essentially, advances in the 
development of the new computing technology that creates the value in the new supercomputer 
make the delivery of the machine on time and to specification more likely. Money market 
conditions may also have changed to make interest rates more favorable for the laboratory (of 
course the reverse can also be true). When the laboratory gets the bids, they look at how they 
vary and use their financial tools to try and figure out which bid is the best deal. The bids can 
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vary in a number of ways. Some have upfront fees, but lower interest rates; or, if the term of 
repayment is shorter, the interest rate may be lower. In order to assess which bid is best, the 
finance advisor has developed analytical tools for playing out all of the bid scenarios for the 
laboratory and to determine which one presents the least risk. Using his spreadsheet financial 
analysis tools, he is able to document, with a 90% confidence level, that given all of the 
uncertainties in a financing scenario (e.g, changes in the market that affect the interest rate and 
the future cost of electricity, since the machine consumes a lot of it), the laboratory will be able 
to make good on the deal, and that the terms of the deal won’t unduly restrict the mission of the 
supercomputing center. 
 In the end, the successful bidder and the laboratory signs another document, a financing 
agreement that says, in the words of the Finance Advisor, “We’re giving you $100 million. 
You’re going to pay it back and you’re going to pay it on this schedule.” Despite the large 
amount of money of the agreement that is reached, the final document is actually quite short, 
about the same number of pages as a home mortgage. This brevity belies the reams of supporting 
documentation, including all of the legalese required to protect both party’s interests that was 
already agreed up on with the signing of the preliminary master lease agreement. By the time the 
final agreement is brokered, trust has already been built on the foundation of the mutual consent 
to those previous terms.  
As a brief thought experiment to underscore the essential function of these documents 
and the standing sets of transformations they instantiate, imagine how this lease negotiation 
process would proceed without inscription in written documentation of any kind, but with only 
oral communication. How would financial officers at the national laboratory solicit, collect and 
negotiate leases with six banks? How would they keep it straight which bank offered which 
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terms for the lease? How would the finance advisor analyze the strengths of the offers? In their 
head? While this exercise might seem simplistic, it recalls for us the broader history of the 
development of writing and documentation and how the growth of modern economies and 
bureaucracies relied on writing technology to coordinate massive amounts of resources and 
people to keep a record of these expenditures. Big science is largely enabled by the mature 
development of modern economies and bureaucracies that have become so efficient at creating 
documentation infrastructures to coordinate massive amounts of resources, technologies and 
people and to mitigate the uncertainty inherent to such enterprises. 
 
Rhetorical Settlement 3: Demonstrated Viability 
 
The demonstrated viability of the new technology and the successful development and delivery 
of the supercomputer to specification constitute the third rhetorical settlement [Fig. 2, Risk 3] that 
must accrete in order to satisfactorily mitigate the financial risks of building the supercomputer. 
However, discovery and innovation in science and technology is, by nature, more or less 
impossible to pin to a financing or production schedule. For example, the Large Hadron Collider 
particle accelerator was conceived of in 1984 and not run at full energy for research purposes 
until 2010, after multiple delays due to budgetary and technical problems. Despite the 
recalcitrance of innovation of bleeding edge technology to adhere to a time schedule, an 
unknown or unlimited time frame for building the supercomputer presents unacceptable risks for 
all of its stakeholders. The laboratory needs to know when to promise scientists that the new 
machine will be available for use, the bank needs to know when the technology is certain enough 
that it can release the money to pay for it, and the chip manufacturing company developing the 
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machine must know when it will make the sale of the computer to the laboratory so that it can 
report the sale (which is sizable, even for a globally important technology company) in its 
earnings. Time and risk are, again, deeply interdependent.  
 While some of the risks of building a supercomputer are satisfactorily mitigated during 
the negotiation to secure financing for the supercomputer (such as the laboratory’s 
trustworthiness), wrangling time in order to reduce uncertainty and its attendant risks for 
stakeholders, or perhaps, thought of in a more positive light, to generate certainty, is an area of 
professional expertise that supports the process of building a supercomputer: project 
management. This second major area of risk mitigation merits its own discussion. 
 
Risk #2:  The development and construction of the supercomputer must be coordinated to 
fit a given budget and timeframe 
 
Project management has not often been discussed or formally researched as a form of writing or 
documentation within Writing Studies, except as an aspect of technical communicators’ practice 
(e.g., Lauren, 2018; Hackos, 2007) or technical and professional writing pedagogy (Pope-Ruark, 
2015); yet, at the same time, it is arguably the single-most essential site for coordinating and 
enabling the large-scale projects of big science. When “big” is understood to mean “expansion 
on many axes” (Galison & Hevly, 1992, p.2), meaning that projects might have impact on whole 
regions, budgets of millions or billions of dollars and depend on the investment of multiple 
nations, the sheer complexity of coordinating this many often competing stakeholders against a 
fixed budget and timeframe becomes apparent. Without a site to codify and stabilize the 
negotiated agreements regarding the development of a large project and a way to track the 
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progress of the project against time, budget and other factors in a principled, validated way, large 
engineering projects of any kind (including large buildings that have been built many times 
before) would have a hard time proceeding and/or coming to fruition.  
At the supercomputing facility, I observed the project manager for the development of the 
new supercomputer sitting, like me, at a computer in a cubicle outside of the office of the deputy 
director of the facility. It struck me as incredible that the labor to coordinate such a complex 
project was almost entirely symbolic analytic work (Johnson-Eilola, 1996) that relied on the 
power and strength of inscribed and circulated rhetorical settlements to manage the constant risks 
that might otherwise obstruct the progress of the project. In an interview he explained to me how 
he does his work: most simply put, “there’s documents for everything.” 
When building a new supercomputer, it is the job of the project manager to track progress 
and to manage risks as they emerge within the inscribed environment of the project management 
software. As a professional endeavor, project management has its own standards, body of 
knowledge and lexicon (Project Management Institute [PMI]), theory, best practices, 
certification processes and controversies that require extensive training and experience to master. 
However, in the simplest terms, project management is a principled approach to tracking 
progress on a project against its budget, timeline, scope and other factors. The careful tracking of 
progress ensures that the project stays in compliance with what the major stakeholders, such as 
the funder (the Department of Energy (DOE)) and the contractors, have already negotiated as 
acceptable parameters for deviation from the plan. In the simplest terms, more deviation means 
higher risk for the success of the project. 
For writing researchers, viewing project management as a genre assemblage focuses our 
attention on the negotiated rhetorical settlements that are the outcomes of project management 
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documentation processes. Each of these rhetorical settlements accretes to mitigate an uncertainty 
that might otherwise overwhelm a project to build a new supercomputer. The rhetorical 
settlements related to project management risks documented in this study are [Fig. 3]:  
 
1. Defined parameters for compliance to remain in good standing 
2. Compliant relationships between budget/time/progress 
3. Continuing stakeholder (funder) support of the project 
 
A closer look at each area of risk reveals the documentation processes that mediate the rhetorical 
settlements that enable the alliance of key actors. 
 
Rhetorical Settlement 1: Defined Parameters for Compliance  
 
Defined parameters for what counts as compliance in order to remain in good standing 
with project stakeholders [Fig. 3, Risk 1]  are the first rhetorical settlement that must accrete in 
order to satisfactorily mitigate the project management risks of building the supercomputer. As 
discussed above, building a new supercomputer is rife with uncertainty not only because it is a 
complex process with many moving parts, but also because the supercomputer depends on chip 
technology that is still in development. It might seem more practical that the supercomputer 
would not be approved for purchase until the chip technology had actually been developed and 
proved functional by one of the world’s leading chip manufacturers. But this is not how it works, 
because in that case all of the risk for developing the new chip would be placed on the chip 
manufacturer and there would not be a good business reason for the company to take on such a 
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risk. On the contrary, modern big science has been able to be successful via creative partnerships 
between public and commercial partners in order to control costs without disabling the 
opportunities for innovative breakthroughs (Boisot, 2011, p.116-134).  
Because the risks of the development of the new chip technology cannot be eliminated 
before a commitment to build the new machine is made, these risks are folded into the project of 
building the new supercomputer. What this means is that the uncertainty around the timeline on 
which the new technology can be developed is accommodated by a document called the project 
execution plan (PEP). The PEP is a long document (around 100 pages) that codifies the 
compliance parameters of the project. The PEP document is the outcome of negotiations between 
the federal funding agency and the administration at the national laboratory and the 
supercomputing center. It is the governing document that determines the parameters for 
measuring compliance and that sets out objectives for the project and how they will be 
accomplished. The document is thorough and meticulous at breaking down the steps of the 
project by section so that no step is left unknown. Extra time is allotted as a buffer for steps, such 
as chip development, that are difficult to control. Another important outcome of this document is 
transparency, which is essential for maintaining the alliance of taxpayers to the project via the 
documentation of the national laboratory’s legitimacy and credibility.  
This also means that the project plan doesn’t only include steps in the project that are 
about the physical installation of the machine. Far from it—included in the plan, which spans 
several years of work, are steps that involve upgrading the utilities at the supercomputing center 
in order to accommodate a machine that uses more power than previous machines, teams of 
software engineers who develop software that can run on the new chip and test it using simulated 
environments provided by the chip manufacturer, and efforts at education and training so that 
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when the computer comes online it can be put to use right away. While, in essence, at the point 
of initial agreement to purchase the machine, it cannot yet be built, all of the stakeholders agree 
that risks inherent to developing the new machine have been satisfactorily mitigated in the 
project execution plan. As long as an acceptable level of risk is maintained, arguments cannot be 
marshalled that would impede the progress of the project. 
Since project management is, by definition, a principled approach to managing projects, 
the principles that guide a project vary by industry, project-scale and type. Therefore, a large-
scale project is managed based upon a set of principles that have been agreed upon prior to the 
project beginning. In the context of the national laboratories, a set of principles have been 
previously codified as a part of the nation’s research infrastructure in a manual called Earned 
Value Management System and Project Management Standard Operating Procedure 
(Department of Energy, Office of Acquisition and Project Management). As a set of principles 
and guidelines developed originally by the United States Air Force, Earned Value Management 
System (EVMS) guides the project management of many public projects. One of the goals of 
EVMS is transparency, which is important when public money is being used to ensure that trust 
is maintained with the public and its political proxies. The objectives of EVMS include: 
 
• Relate time phased budgets to specific contract tasks and/or statements of work. 
• Provide the basis to capture work progress assessments against the baseline plan. 
• Relate technical, schedule, and cost performance. 
• Provide valid, timely, and auditable data/information for proactive management action.  
• Supply managers with a practical level of summarization for effective decision making. 
(from Humphrey’s Associates, EVMS Education Center Basic Concepts of Earned Value 
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Management (EVM), pdf downloaded from Humphreys-assoc.com 9/23/16, my 
emphasis). 
 
While these objectives are difficult to understand in the abstract, notice how the fundamental 
notion underwriting them is the relationships among elements of the project (e.g., “relate,” 
“against the baseline plan”). In an EVMS project management plan, the complex relationships 
between budget, time, and project progress, including planned project progress and actual and 
future project progress are tracked in a type of chart called a matrix. One of the advantages of a 
standardized set of principles for project management is that a project’s progress can be defined 
against a standard that is already acceptable to the federal funding agency. Importantly, unlike 
many commercial building projects, EVMS matrixes don’t incentivize contractors to finish 
projects either under budget or ahead of schedule—and this on purpose. For most public projects, 
the ideal is to transparently meet budget and timeline projections right on target, since public 
funders usually don’t have a mechanism to take money back from a project once that money has 
been allocated to be spent in a certain way. 
 
Rhetorical Settlement 2: Compliant Relationships  
 
Compliant relationships between the three axes of budget, time and progress [Fig. 3, Risk 
2] are the second rhetorical settlement that must accrete in order to satisfactorily mitigate the 
project management risks of building the supercomputer. The careful tracking of a project’s 
progress against its budget and its timeline is often inscribed via a commercially available 
enterprise software program, such as Oracle’s Primavera or Microsoft Project, by a project 
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manager with professional training to manage projects of this scale. Initially, every single step of 
the project is entered into the program by the control account manager (CAM) responsible for 
any given part of the project (and in a large project, there would be many CAMs), including 
information about each step’s start and completion times and budget situation. As the project 
moves forward, progress can be tracked via tools in the software for visualizing relationships 
among elements of the project. These visualization tools make it possible to assess when steps 
are out of compliance given the negotiated parameters for what is an acceptable rate of progress 
given time and budget constraints. What is considered an acceptable tolerance for being out of 
compliance is a previously negotiated quantity codified in the project execution plan (PEP) and 
expressed in terms of plus or minus a number of percentage points. 
One of the more commonly known types of inscriptions that enable project managers to 
track progress against time is called a Gantt chart, after the engineer who invented them in the 
early 20th century, Henry Gantt. A Gantt chart is a horizontal bar chart that visualizes activities, 
or steps, of a project displayed against the time interval planned for each step. As the project 
proceeds, the status of each step of the project is kept up to date so that it becomes visible which 
steps are out of compliance. The project manager for the new supercomputer explained that a 
step is out of compliance when its bar turns red. A step can be out of compliance for several 
reasons: 1. if it is behind schedule, 2. if it is ahead of schedule, or 3. if it is either over or under 
budget based on the parameters that have been determined as acceptable for this project. In this 
way the progress on the project is objectified (Callon, 1986), or codified and stabilized, so that 
its status can be circulated among the CAMS who each oversee small slices of it. For example, 
the data center floor manager oversees the installation of the cooling and electrical systems for 
the new machine, and the Early Science Program manager oversees the development of new 
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software for the chip. Once the CAMs can see how their portions of the project are out of 
compliance, they can be held accountable for bringing them back into compliance or for coming 
up with arguments to justify their status. In this way the Gantt chart mediates between the 
abstracted, data-centric work of project management and the creative and material work of 
building the new supercomputer.  
 
Rhetorical Settlement 3: Continuing Stakeholder Support  
 
Continuing stakeholder support of the project [Fig. 3, Risk 3], in particular that of the funder 
(DOE), is the third rhetorical settlement that must accrete in order fully mitigate the project 
management risks of building the supercomputer. In EVMS, maintaining relationships among 
elements of the project includes relationships among people and the data they need to maintain 
their stake in the project. One of the EVMS principles is to provide valid, timely, and auditable 
data/information for proactive management action. In other words, project management of a 
complicated engineering project relies on data about the project being accessible to those who 
need it when they need it. This access is maintained via formal documentation and reporting 
processes unique to particular organizational environments, such as the Department of Energy’s 
(DOE) Risk Management Plan described above, but also at a more abstract level by the practice 
of project management itself. 
The importance of inscription to project management, and of project management to 
project success, is a fact that the companies that develop and sell the most common project 
management software systems know well. On the website of a well-known software company, 
an infographic in the sales materials poses the question, “Now, where is my data?” The problem 
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is summed up under a heading that reads, “The issue with word of mouth: Information is needed 
by all parties in large maintenance, engineering, and construction projects. But where is it? Does 
Bob have this information on his notepad? But where is Bob and how will this information be 
shared if there isn’t one source?” According to the infographic, the implications for keeping all 
of the project information in the mind or the personal computer of one person are disastrous—in 
fact, the project will crumble like a teetering tower built from play wooden blocks. This 
illustration recalls the thought experiment above about managing a bid process with no way to 
write anything down. 
Once the project begins, agreement is maintained that the project is on track via the 
circulation of a status report document called a contract performance report. These reports 
maintain agreement among stakeholders and with the funder (DOE) that the project is on track 
within the previously negotiated parameters in the project execution plan (PEP). These monthly 
reports show trends in the cost index and the schedule index and map budgeted costs and actual 
costs into the future. Aspects of the project in alignment with the negotiated parameters earn the 
value of 1. Steps that are out of alignment must fall within the acceptable parameters (either plus 
or minus an amount from 1) for the project. If they extend beyond these parameters, then they 
turn up as red bars and a corrective action plan is sought. Any change to the parameters generates 
more documentation. As the project manager interviewed at the supercomputing facility said 




This section closes the circle on the argument I have been developing about big science, the 
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functions of writing for technical organizations, mitigating uncertainty, and infrastructure. I do 
this by connecting the existing US research infrastructure with “infrastructure” as a metaphor for 
technical documentation and reporting processes in the context of big science and more broadly. 
Simply put, I argue that the essential function of the technical documents that comprise the genre 
assemblages in Figs. 2 and 3 to mitigate the uncertainty of building a new supercomputer suggest 
that they, too, are part of what science policy scholars recognize as the national research 
infrastructure (Jacob & Hallonsten, 2012, p. 412). Foregrounding documentation that normally 
hides in the background of the activities of high-performance computing undertakes a project of 
infrastructural inversion (Bowker and Star, 1999) with the goal of ascribing “causal prominence” 
(p. 34) to documents that have low-visibility outside the immediate work context. While it might 
seem more appealing to study the published products of science produced with the help of the 
machine, such as beautiful data visualizations of climate models or protein structures, this study 
has purposefully focused on the documents that enable the mission of the supercomputing center. 
For Writing Studies, one point of interest in this argument is the potential to theorize what it 
means to define technical reporting and documentation processes as infrastructure at a more 
general level and to consider the implications of this definition for contexts beyond the 
supercomputer and the US national laboratory system.  
To speak of writing as “infrastructural” offers a new rhetorical commonplace for 
discussing the functions of writing in Writing Studies research and new opportunities to define 
what it means in conjunction with more established theoretical approaches, including rhetorical 
genre studies (RGS) and actor-network theory (ANT), particularly as they have been discussed in 
this article. A theory of infrastructure for Writing Studies proceeds from prior research (Hart-
Davidson, et. al., 2007; Frith, 2020; Grabill, 2007, 2010; Read, 2015; Swarts, 2010) that has set 
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precedence by importing notions of infrastructure from the extensive scholarship done in 
information studies by Susan Leigh Star and her colleagues (e.g., Bowker & Star, 1999; Star & 
Ruhleder, 1996). Star’s body of work develops a relational theory of infrastructure that explains 
how information standards, which are negotiated, inscribed in and circulated via documents, 
enable much of our daily experience, such as the electrical grid and the internet. However, in 
previous research the application of the notion of infrastructure to writing has not been consistent 
or developed sufficiently enough to account for how writing products and processes are 
different from information. A theory of infrastructure for Writing Studies synthesizes elements 
of Star’s relational theory, such as a functional definition and a focus on relationships among 
actors (ANT), with established theories and approaches, including what we count as writing and 
genre theory.  
For Writing Studies, a theory of infrastructure (Read, 2019) begins with a commitment to 
an inclusive definition of writing, including, as Winsor (1992) helpfully articulated, writing that 
does not include words, does not require the direct presence of human being and that is not the 
product of the free creation of meaning. In the genre assemblages illustrated by Figs. 2 and 3, 
several of the documents rely on just such an inclusive conceptualization of writing. In Fig. 2 this 
includes financial analysis tools (i.e., spreadsheets), financial reports and machine specifications. 
In Fig. 3 this includes project management matrices, Gantt charts and other project management 
software interfaces. How writing is defined makes different kinds of inscriptions either visible or 
invisible to the writing researcher. To follow through on a project of infrastructural inversion 
requires adopting the broadest possible definition of what counts as writing.  
A relational theory of infrastructure also relies on a functional definition for what counts 
as infrastructure. This means that what counts as infrastructural is defined by what the document 
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or genre actually does for the community (i.e., its social action) for which it has meaning, not by 
material characteristics, such as number of pages, format or a glossy presentation, or bureaucratic 
fiat. In Fig. 2, a preliminary master lease agreement must be signed before a financial institution 
can be invited to submit a bid to finance the new supercomputer. Signing the document signals 
agreement with the non-negotiable terms of the lease before negotiated terms, such as interest 
rate and repayment timeline, can be discussed. In Fig. 3, a project execution plan (PEP) has an 
infrastructural function because it codifies the compliance parameters of the project and the steps 
required to complete it that have been negotiated by the federal funding agency and the 
administration at the national laboratory and the supercomputing center. Without such a codified 
agreement it would not be possible to move forward with building a new supercomputer, which 
includes maintaining compliance in order to continue to receive project funding. By contrast, 
consider documentation processes that were created to be infrastructural, but have failed to be so, 
such as environmental impact statements (Miller, 2015), or, I might argue, the strategic plan of a 
university, where turnover at the upper-level administration and on the board of trustees has left 
it without a champion. 
While Star did not develop her relational theory of infrastructure within the context of 
genre studies, her model invites a synthesis with Writing Studies’ notion of genre as social 
action. Genre is an analytical construct that helps make causal connections between the formal, 
discursive and rhetorical aspects of a text and the social, political and technological context that 
it both constitutes and is created by. In this article, the added dimension of genre assemblages as 
instantiations of standing sets of transformations (SSTs) has revealed one of the mechanisms of 
these causal relationships that are so useful for a project of infrastructural inversion.  
The original 8 “dimensions” (Star & Ruhleder, 1996) of infrastructure already resonate 
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strongly with how we tend to understand genre in Writing Studies: infrastructure is sunk into 
other structures, social arrangements and technologies; infrastructure is incorporated into tacit 
practices; infrastructure is learned as part of community membership; and, infrastructure both 
shapes and is shaped by the conventions of a community of practice (p. 113). In fact, genre is 
effectively already a theory of infrastructure for writing, although it has not previously been 
explicitly theorized as such. A genre from Fig. 3 that is useful to consider in light of genre theory 
is the contract performance report, which is a periodically issued status report on the progress of 
building a new supercomputer. In technical organizations, reporting documents tend to be 
viewed as static, after-the-fact documentation of what has already happened rather than as 
dynamic documents on which future contingencies rely, such as maintaining the trust of the 
funder and the project funding. In this case genre theory, and by extension a relational theory of 
infrastructure, is a useful analytical tool for articulating how even reporting documentation 
continues to enact social action during the complete cycle of authorship, circulation and 
archiving.   
Finally, Star’s development of a relational theory of infrastructure within the context of 
actor-network theory (ANT) has useful ramifications for Writing Studies researchers. In short, 
ANT focuses the attention of research on the relationships between objects and people (actors) 
and establishes continuity, rather than division, between technical and social actors by assigning 
agency to nonhuman actors. ANT affords researchers the opportunity to define documentation 
processes as mediators involved in the enrollment of stakeholders essential to building and 
maintaining the socio-technical network of which the supercomputer is an outcome. For 
example, the reported results of testing a new chip technology function to enroll a working, 
reliable chip technology to the project (Fig. 1). In Fig. 3, black Gantt chart bars are enrolled if 
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Control Account Managers (CAMs) are keeping their parts of the project on budget and on-time. 
Black Gantt chart bars signal that the project is continuing within compliance parameters and can 
therefore continue to be funded. Without the inscribed enrollment of either working computer 
chip technology or black Gantt chart bars, the project to build a supercomputer would face 
significant technical and financial obstacles. Similar to the affordance of genre to make visible 
causal connections between document form and content and context, actor-network theory makes 
visible actors, and non-human actors in particular, that may not always be able to speak for 





In this article I have argued that assemblages of genres related to building a new 
supercomputer function as essential infrastructure for the US national laboratory system and for 
big science endeavors in general. These genre assemblages, in particular those related to the 
documentation of financing and project management, function as infrastructure because they 
mitigate the inherent uncertainties and attendant risks of big science. In other words, for the 
inquisitive visitor standing in the machine room at the supercomputing center, they are a key 
answer to the question, “How does one build such a complex and expensive supercomputer?” 
This finding has implications for researchers in terms of adding to our vocabulary, and ultimately 
our metaphorical imagination, for the functions that writing has for technical organizations.  
This article has drawn on Writing Studies research that uses genre theory and ANT to 
document various functions of writing in industry. Generally speaking, however, this research 
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has had little impact outside of academia, especially in terms of affecting professionals’ 
understanding of how writing relates to their professions or in terms of shaping technical and 
professional writing pedagogy at universities. Almost anyone in technical fields will, if asked, be 
able to tell you that the value of good writing is its power to enable clear communication, which 
is essential to advancement in a technical career. This generalized understanding of the value of 
writing is a demonstrable gain over several decades ago, as evidenced by the support 
accreditation organizations in technical fields have put behind communication curriculum (e.g., 
ABET 2000’s inclusion of communication outcomes for engineering programs). It would be 
much more challenging to find, however, a non-Writing Studies researcher who will tell you that 
technical documentation constitutes social action—that technical writing is not secondary to 
technical work and organizations, but constitutive of them. The limited scope of how technical 
writing is construed in classrooms and in industry has consequences, I believe, for how students 
in technical professions are taught to write and for how time spent writing is valued in the 
workplace. 
In the technical and professional writing classroom, writing teachers often struggle 
against entrenched notions of what counts as writing in technical organizations and the perceived 
lack of value in teaching future technical professionals about the world of documentation that 
will comprise their professions. In general, the function of writing to communicate, as 
instantiated by the common genres of workplace communication (e.g., memos, letters/emails, 
short reports, resumes), tend to dominate standard textbooks and commonsense notions of why 
teaching writing is important. While all writing has at least some communicative function, 
writing also functions beyond the traditional rhetorical triangle of rhetor-message-audience. This 
is where a theorized notion of infrastructure is a powerful addition to the theoretical and 
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methodological repertoire of Writing Studies and an alternative to more abstruse language, such 
as “constitute,” or “translation,” sourced directly from genre theory or actor-network theory 
(ANT).  
The powerful commonplace entailments of infrastructure as a metaphor for the many 
documentation processes that undergird the operations of organizations are accessible to students 
and teachers of technical and professional writing without deep forays into theory. For example, 
imagine what might be contained in a textbook section entitled, “Infrastructural Genres in 
Technical Organizations” (e.g., READMEs, project management matrices, APIs, leases and 
other legal documentation) as a partner to the more familiar section called “Genres of Workplace 
Communication” (e.g., email, memos, reports, resumes, websites, etc.). However, if siloing 
genres into only two functions seems to oversimplify the complex, multi-functional social 
actions enacted by most genres, students in more advanced technical writing courses could take 
on a more theorized notion of infrastructural writing and research a genre’s multiple functions 
themselves.  
This article has argued that the function of leasing and project management processes to 
mitigate uncertainty qualifies them as not only part of the US research infrastructure but also as 
infrastructural in a broader, theoretically defined sense. However, mitigating uncertainty may be 
only one possible infrastructural function of technical reporting and documentation processes. 
Work remains to fully document how writing functions infrastructurally across all contexts for 
writing and to test whether a unified notion of “infrastructural writing” holds. After all, what it 
means for writing to communicate has evolved over time with successive theories that have 
evolved from the direct transaction of information to sophisticated models that account for 
structural power relations, distributed authorship and interpretive variation (Slack et. al, 1993). 
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This article develops a theory of infrastructure for Writing Studies rooted in genre theory, ANT 
and Starr’s relational theory of infrastructure. Those frameworks, however, may only be relevant 
to certain contexts and shift over time. Regardless, I believe that like “communication,” 
“infrastructure” can be an enduring framework for how we understand and value the writing and 
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